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CURRENT DECISIONS
ever, was expected.29 It was demanded by Baggett and Elfbrandt.
In the case at bar, the Court impliedly conceded that the specific
oath was not invalid for vagueness. Thus, while striking down the
pertinent provisions of the Ober Act, it has answered its own demand
that legislation authorizing loyalty oaths be narrowly drawn. That
answer is for state legislatures to conform their loyalty statutes and
oaths to the express provisions of the Whitehill oath.
Constitutional Law-Criminal Law-RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT PRO-
BATION REVOCATION HEARINGS. On June 17, 1959, petitioner Mempa,
following a plea of guilty in the Spokane County Superior Court, was
convicted of larceny of an automobile' and placed on probation with
the imposition of sentence deferred.2 Five months later a probation re-
vocation hearing was held pursuant to an allegation by the Spokane
County prosecuting attorney that Mempa had been involved in a burg-
lary on September 15, 1959. At this hearing Mempa, then 17, was not
represented by counsel nor was inquiry made by the court as to
whether the defendant desired assistance of counsel. When questioned
by the court, Mempa affirmed his complicity in the burglary. The
hearing was immediately terminated and the court revoked the de-
fendant's probation, imposing sentence of ten years in the penitentiary'
with the recommendation that the sentence be reduced to one year. 4
In 1966, Mempa filed a petition on his own behalf for a writ of habeas
corpus claiming that he had been denied right to counsel at the proba-
tion revocation hearing. The Washington State Supreme Court dis-
missed the petitions and the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.' In its decision, 7 the Court reversed, holding that the presence
of counsel is necessary in probation revocation or deferred sentencing
hearings.
decisions the oaths expressly or by implication included the statutory terms of the
enabling acts.
29. "If Gerende is ripe for final dispatch, the task is for the Supreme Court, not a
subordinate court." Whitehill v. Elkins, 258 F. Supp. 589, 598 (D. Md. 1966). See
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) overruling Adler.
1. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.54.020 (1961).
2. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.95.200 (1961).
3. WAsu. REV. CODE § 9.95.010 (1961).
4. WASH. REv. CODE § 9.95.030 (1961).
5. Mempa v. Rhay, 68 Wash. 2nd 882,416 P. 2nd 104 (1966).
6. Mempa v. Rhay, 386 U.S. 907 (1967).
7. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
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The right of a defendant in criminal proceedings to be represented
by counsel has developed from the singular application in the federal
jurisdictions as a result of the sixth amendment" to the all pervasive
application in State criminal proceedings through the equal protection
provisions of the fourteenth amendment.9 The first direct correlation
by the United States Supreme Court of the due process standard on a
State's interpretation of the right to counsel occured in Powell v. Ala-
bama.10 Required by Alabama statute to appoint counsel for defendants
in all capital cases, the trial court appointed all the members of the
local bar to assist in the preparation of the defense of an unpopular cause
and, if no single counsel appeared for the defendants, to continue the
defense through the trial. In its decision the Supreme Court noted the
special circumstances" surrounding the trial and concluded that the
collective appointment of all the local lawyers was, in actuality, the
appointment of no one and the "defendants were not accorded the right
of counsel in any substantial sense." 12 From the wording of the Powell
decision it is clear that, while not doubting the need for counsel in the
particular case, the Court was evaluating the effectiveness of the ap-
pointed counsel and was not establishing the right of a criminal de-
fendant in state proceedings to the assistance of counsel. 3
In decisions following Powell, the Supreme Court's approach to a
defendant's right to counsel in state criminal proceedings emphasized
either the particular procedures of the jurisdiction 14 or the special cir-
8. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
10. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
11. "In the light of the facts outlined in the forefront of this opinion-the ignorance
of and illiteracy of the defendants, their youth, the circumstances of public hostility,
the imprisonment and close surveillance of the defendants by the military forces, the
fact that their friends and families were all in other states and communication with
them necessarily difficult, and above all that they stood in deadly peril of their lives-
we think the failure of the trial court to give them reasonable time and opportunity to
secure counsel was a clear denial of due process." 287 U.S. at 71.
12. 287 U.S. at 58.
13. "Whether this [denial of due process] would be so in other criminal prosecutions,
or under other circumstances, we need not determine. All that is necessary now to
decide, as we do decide, is that in a capital case, where the defendant is unable to obtain
counsel, and is incapable adequately of making his own defense because of ignorance,
feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court, whether requested
or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of law." 287
U.S. at 71.
14. Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 (1944); Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949);
Cash v. Culver, 358 U.S. 633 (1959); Huson v. North Carolina, 365 U.S. 697 (1960);
Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962).
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cumstances of the case.15 The concept of due process in state criminal
proceedings was governed by the subjective standard of what would
"constitute a denial of fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal
sense of justice" 16 in the absence of direct application of the fourteenth
amendment. That the sixth amendment had no application to the states
through the fourteenth amendment was confirmed by the decision of
the Court in Betts v. Brady.'7 In handing down that decision Mr. Justice
Roberts, after presenting a comprehensive survey of state treatment
of the criminal defendant's right to counsel, 8 grounded his opinion on
the importance of evaluating the special circumstances in each case, and
rejected any requirement that counsel be present to ensure due process
in all criminal proceedings. 9
Even as the Court held that the sixth amendment was not obligatory
on the states it continued to recognize that there could be instances
where the denial of counsel worked a denial of due process to the de-
fendant.20 Examples of such circumstances were not limited to a trial
on the merits but included such collateral proceedings as pleading dur-
ing arraignment,21 a hearing to determine the degree of a crime to
which a guilty plea had been entered22 and sentencing after a plea of
guilty;21 in all such cases the decision upholding the right to counsel
turned on the procedural consequences of the unknowing defendant's
actions. As the exceptions to the Betts v. Brady rule continued to ex-
pand, the value of the rule as an aid to the prosecution was lost and it
15. DeMeerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947); Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672
(1948); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948); Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S.
437 (1948).
16. "Asserted denial [of due process] is to be tested by an appraisal of the totality
of the facts in a given case. That which may, in one setting, constitute a denial of
fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice, may, in other circum-
stances, and in the light of other considerations, fall short of such a denial." Betts
v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455,462 (1942).
17. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
18. "This material demonstrates that, in the great majority of the states, it has been
the considered judgment of the people, their representatives and the courts that ap-
pointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to fair trial. On the con-
trary, the matter has generally been deemed one of legislative policy." 316 U.S. at 471.
19. "To deduce from the due process clause a rule binding upon the states in this
matter would be to impose upon them . . . a requirement without distinction between
charges of different magnitude or in respect of courts of varying jurisdiction." 316
U.S. at 473.
20. See foomotes 14, 15 supra.
21. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
22. Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155 (1957).
23. Townsend v. Burke, 334 US. 736 (1948).
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became clear that, for a conviction to stand, the presence of counsel
was necessary whenever the rights of the accused were threatened.
With the decision in Gideon v. Wainwright,24 Betts v. Brady was ex-
pressly overruled and the right to counsel was made a mandatory
element of state criminal proceedings through the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment regardless of the circumstances of
the case, the provisions of the state's legislation or the ability of the ac-
cused to obtain counsel.
While the decision in Gideon is aimed at providing the indigent de-
fendant with counsel at his criminal trial the decisions during the reign
of Betts v. Brady served to extend this unqualified right to assistance
of counsel at "every stage of the criminal proceeding where substantial
rights of the criminal accused may be affected." 25 Through this com-
bination of judicial decisions and the application of the requirements of
the sixth amendment, the scope of a criminal defendant's right to counsel
does not begin and end with the trial on the merits but includes every
stage of the judicial proceedings regardless of the presence of peculiar
circumstances which may work to prejudice the accused.
In the present case, the defendant, while represented by counsel,
pleaded guilty to larceny and was placed on probation without sentence
being imposed. The State argued that, due to the requirement that the
trial judge impose the maximum sentence for each conviction, 26 sen-
tencing actually had occurred when the defendant had been placed on
probation.27 In rejecting this argument, the Supreme Court noted that,
as a result of judicial interpretation, a Washington defendant can take
an appeal from a plea of guilty followed by probation only after sentence
is imposed following revocation of probation, 2 and that the original
plea of guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to the imposition of
sentence. 29 In addition the Court noted that while the actual determina-
tion of the length of the sentence is made by the Board of Prison Terms
and Paroles,"° that body places great weight on the required recom-
24. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
25. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
26. VAsH. R~v. CODE § 9.95.010 (1961).
27. Washington statute provides that the actual length of the sentence shall be de-
termined by the Board of Prison Terms and Paroles following the incarceration of
the prisoner. WASH. REv. CODE § 9.95.040 (1961).
28. State v. Farmer, 39 Wash. 2nd 675, 237 P.2nd 734 (1951), State v. Proctor, 68 Wash.
2nd 817, 415 P.2nd 634 (1966).
29. WASH. REv. CODE § 10.40.175 (1961).
30. WASH. REv. CODE § 9.95.040 (1961).
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mendation compiled by the trial judge and the prosecuting attorney.31
The importance to the defendant of being represented by counsel who
has only his best interests in mind when such a recommendation is pre-
pared can not be underestimated.
It is clear from the decision in the present case that the Supreme
Court is extending the Gideon doctrine beyond the actual trial while
looking for factors which may prejudice the rights of the accused
absent the assistance of counsel. Such an approach will focus increased
attention on the administration of State laws which affect the status
of the defendant before32 or after33 his trial. If state criminal prosecu-
tions are to remain free of the stigma of denial of due process not only
must the accused have the assistance of counsel at his trial, but also
he must have access to counsel both as the state prepares him for trial
and until the court has actually sentenced him following conviction.
Federal Procedure-HABEAS CORPUS-THE PREMATURITY DOCTRINE.
Prisoners Rowel and Thacker,2 while serving consecutive sentences, the
second of which would not commence until the years 1993 and 1994
respectively, sought the remedy of habeas corpus to attack their future
sentences on constitutional grounds. Rowe's scheduled eligibility for
parole is in 1975 and would be advanced to 1971 if his second sentence
were invalidated. Thacker becomes eligible for parole in 1976 without
any possibility of parole advancement. Conceding that both petitioners
31. WASH. REv. CODE § 9.95.030 (1961).
32. An example would be a determination whether the defendant should be prose-
cuted as a juvenile.
33. Examples would be probation revocation hearings as in the present case, deferred
sentencing as in the companion case-Walkling v. Washington State Board of Prison
Terms and Paroles, 389 U.S. 128 (1967), or sentencing under a State Habitual Offender
Act.
1. In 1963 Rowe was convicted of rape and sentenced to thirty years, then three
days later arraigned for the felonious abduction of the same female. His plea of former
jeopardy was overruled and upon advice from counsel he pleaded guilty. He was con-
victed of the second count and sentenced to twenty years, to run consecutively with
the rape sentence. Rowe has attacked his second sentence on the grounds of former
jeopardy and the involuntariness of his guilty plea. His petition was rejected by the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia without an opinion.
2. In 1964 Thacker was sentenced to the Virginia State Penitentiary to serve a sentence
of over sixty years. Petitioner wants to attack three sentences which are scheduled
to commence in 1994 and end in the year 2004. His date of eligibility for parole
would not be advanced even if the three sentences were vacated. Thacker bases his
petition on the grounds of inadequate representation by his counsel at the 1953 con-
victions.
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